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Recently scientists have started to examine how land-uses and land-use 
technologies can help mitigate carbon emissions.  The half million small-scale farmers 
inhabiting the Amazon frontier sequester large stocks of carbon in their forests and other 
land uses that they might be persuaded to maintain or even increase through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.  On average, small-scale farmers 
in the Pedro Peixoto settlement project of Acre (Western Brazilian Amazon), had a stock of 
10,067 tons of above- and below-ground carbon on their farms in 1994, 88 percent of 
which was stored in their forest reserves.  The income and carbon mitigation effects of three 
types of carbon payments are analyzed in this paper: (1) above- or total-carbon stock 
payments paid for carbon retained in the forest or stored in all land-uses, (2) above- or 
total-carbon flow payments paid for carbon stored in all land-uses, and (3) above- or total-
carbon net stock payments paid for carbon stored in all land-uses.  The main conclusions 
are that carbon payments can be effective in preserving forest and carbon, but should be 
based on carbon stocks or net carbon stock rather than carbon flows.  Payments tied to 
forest carbon or carbon in all land-uses provide inexpensive carbon offset potential, and 
payments based on total instead of above-ground carbon only slightly dilute the forest 
preservation effect of carbon payments.  One-time carbon payments as low as R$15/t of 
carbon stock would preserve half of the existing forest carbon on these farms.  Carbon flow 
payments, on the other hand, do not provide an adequate economic incentive to slow 
deforestation because forests are more or less in equilibrium and thus do not sequester 
additional carbon.  If the Kyoto Protocol were amended to allow for conservation of forest 
carbon, a few potential CDMs could provide inexpensive carbon offsets, alleviate poverty, 
and preserve biodiversity.  Sustainable forest management, for instance, increases both farm 
income and carbon and forest preservation and could provide inexpensive carbon offsets.  
Other projects could also provide inexpensive carbon offsets and preserve biodiversity, but 
would require additional income and technology transfers to compensate farmers for their 
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SMALL-SCALE FARMS IN THE WESTERN BRAZILIAN AMAZON: 
CAN THEY BENEFIT FROM CARBON TRADE? 
 
Chantal Line Carpentier, Steve Vosti, and Julie Witcover
* 
 
1.    INTRODUCTION 
If the Kyoto Protocol is ratified, twenty-nine industrialized countries will be required to 
mitigate their emissions of six key greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, by at least 5 
percent by 2008-12.  Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Protocol indicate that countries can either 
reduce their own carbon emissions (e.g., by improving energy efficiency or switching to fuels 
with lower carbon content) or by increasing carbon sequestration through reforestation and 
other vegetative investments to achieve their targeted decrease in atmospheric carbon (United 
Nations 1999a).  Growing vegetation is a carbon sink because it removes carbon dioxide 
(CO2) from the air and stores it through photosynthesis in plant biomass, both above and below 
ground.  New carbon is sequestered until the vegetation matures, at which time the stock of 
carbon reaches equilibrium and ceases to grow anymore.  Article 12 of the Protocol, referred to 
as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows electric utilities and other carbon emitters 
in developed countries to invest in sustainable  
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development projects in developing countries that mitigate carbon at lower cost and credit this 
carbon to their targeted reductions.  However, it is not clear whether carbon sequestered in 
existing forests is eligible under the Protocol (Richards 1999).  If proposals to include forest 
carbon are accepted in 2000, then CDMs designed to promote sustainable development on 
small farms in settlement projects could preserve forest and biodiversity and alleviate poverty.
1  
The CDM benefits developing countries because of the financial and technical support they 
receive and they also benefit from the resulting global reduction in greenhouse gases (Duncan et 
al. 1999).  Developed countries have advocated the inclusion of forest carbon because, in 
addition to sequestering the most carbon, forests have value to national and international 
stakeholders because of their role in modifying local climate and for watershed protection and 
the maintenance of biodiversity. 
Small farmers in the Western Brazilian Amazon are investment poor but have 
tremendous forest resources.
2  However, under prevailing economic and policy conditions, 
forests are perceived as impediments to these farmers.  For instance, by law farmers must 
maintain 50 percent of their holdings as forest reserves yet, for all practical purposes, they are 
not allowed to undertake commercial timber extraction from that area. Thus, the only economic 
value the forest offers to farmers is the household and commercial value of non- 
                                                 
1 Though it appears evident the Kyoto Protocol will not be ratified, the momentum in the 
carbon trade industry is such that something else will likely replace it. 
2 This report focuses on small-scale farmers because they comprise a large number of 






                                                                                                                                                 
large farm enterprises and extractivists, could also be sources of carbon sequestration but are 





timber tree products and the on-farm use of timber.  Because extraction in a forest setting (as 
opposed to a plantation setting) can be extremely labor intensive and markets for non-timber 
tree products are limited, the land on which the forest stands has more value for farmers as 
agricultural land than as forest.  Without external interventions, farmers in the area have every 
incentive to deforest and plant pasture (Carpentier, Vosti, and Witcover, forthcoming), thereby 
emitting greenhouse gases (GHGs) and creating a poorer carbon sink.  With sustainable 
development projects under the CDM, these small-scale farmers might retain large stocks of 
forest carbon in their on-farm forest reserves or sequester additional carbon by opting for higher 
carbon-content land-uses. 
The objectives of this paper are a) to derive the types and levels of compensatory 
payments that would be required to induce small Western Amazonian farmers to retain their 
forest carbon, and b) analyze the amounts of carbon that would be sequestered under potential 
CDM projects and the implications for rural incomes and environmental sustainability.  To 
achieve these objectives we use a farm-level bioeconomic model calibrated for a typical small 
farmer in the Pedro Peixote settlement project in the Acre region of the Western Brazilian 
Amazon.  
2.    METHOD 
A bioeconomic model (FaleBEM) of a representative small-scale subsistence-oriented 
farmer in the forest margins of the Pedro Peixoto settlement project was available for the 





described below, and is then used to simulate the consequences of alternative carbon 
sequestration policies for land use, farm income and carbon sequestration.  
THE FaleBEM MODEL 
FaleBEM is a dynamic mathematical programming model that is written and solved in 
GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus 1992).  It simulates the typical farmer’s responses to 
a wide range of policy, technology and project interventions. The model incorporates all the 
important biophysical and economic factors that are thought to affect farmers' decisions about 
land use and deforestation (see Carpentier et al., forthcoming, for a more detailed description of 
the model).  
The model assumes that farmers maximize the discounted value of their household 
consumption over a 15-year time horizon.  There are also minimum consumption constraints that 
must be met each year for food, clothes and farm implements.  The model allocates farm income 
each year to consumption and on-farm investments.  When income is invested it increases future 
production potential, and hence future consumption, but at the expense of current consumption. 
Income is generated in the model by producing products for home consumption or sale. 
Production choices are subject to an array of resources and technology constraints, including 
seasonal land, labor and cash flow constraints.  In addition to on-farm production, the 
household can engage in extractive activities in the forest (e.g., harvesting Brazil nuts), and sell 
household labor off farm.  It can also hire non-family labor to work on the family farm.  Since 





This assumption is less defensible for non-timber tree products because these products have 
limited marketing outlets.  But the model produces such small quantities that the impact on 
income of any downside price effects can reasonably be ignored.  The model also tracks soil 
fertility and soil nutrient balances, and these impact on future productivity levels within the 
planning period of the model.  Soil fertility can be improved by adding inorganic fertilizers, by 
changing the cropping pattern, by putting land into fallow, or opening new areas to production 
(deforesting).  By tracking soil nutrients in the forest, fallow, and the cultivated areas and linking 
them to crop nutrient demands and yields, FaleBEM effectively links deforestation decisions to 
production decisions on the cleared land.  FaleBEM also limits certain trades in inputs and 
products to reflect market imperfections.  For example, milk sales are constrained by quotas, 
and the maximum amount of hired labor that can be acquired in any given month is restricted to 
15 man-days.  
Although the model has a 15-year planning horizon, it is also solved recursively at five-
year intervals.  By updating all the constraint values on the right hand side for each solution, a 
series of moving 15-year farm plans are obtained that can be used to track much longer periods 
of time than the initial 15-year period.  This is especially useful for exploring long-term changes 
in land use and the sustainability aspects of different farming practices.  The results presented in 
this paper are based on a 25-year period, and were derived from five recursive runs of the 
model for each policy experiment. 
The FaleBEM model is calibrated to a set of initial conditions that define the model's 





and the prevailing technology and prices.  These conditions were determined from field data 
collected in 1994 in the Pedro Peixoto settlement project in Acre.  The model represents a 
typical small but well situated farm with medium quality soils.  
FaleBEM also keeps track of how many hectares of forest and cleared land remain on 
the farm in any year and the age of these different land-uses.  Using this information, the on-farm 
carbon stock and flow are calculated each year.  This provides a basis for evaluating the 
impacts of alternative carbon sequestration policies.  For example, by introducing options for 
carbon payments against particular land uses, the model can evaluate the types and levels of 
payments that would be required to induce desired changes in land use practices, including the 
retention of more forest.  Moreover, by adding minimum constraints on the amount of carbon 
that must be maintained each year, the model provides shadow prices that measure the 
opportunity cost to the household (in terms of the discounted consumption foregone) of 
allocating land from alternative uses to sequester one more ton of carbon. 
CARBON MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
FaleBEM tracks both the above- and below- ground carbon content associated with 
different land uses.  The data for these purposes (Figure 1) were obtained from Braz et al. 
(1998), Palm et al. (1999), and Woomer et al. (1999).  A few points relevant to carbon 
measurement are worth making.  First, the appropriate measure of carbon for perennial and 
fallow systems is the average carbon content over the life of the system, not the maximum 





different land-uses are mostly due to differences in their above-ground carbon.  Above-ground 
carbon varies from a low of 3 t/ha for degraded pasture to 150 t/ha for primary forest, whereas 
below-ground carbon varies from a low of 47 t/ha for agroforestry to 78t/ha for young fallow
3.  
Unlike soils in temperate zones, tropical soils stock similar amounts of carbon below ground 
regardless of land use.  Third, only forest management comes close to retaining the same level of 
total and above-ground carbon as primary forest (about 8 percent less).  Even agroforestry 
systems sequester only half the total carbon and a third of the above-ground carbon of primary 
forest.  Fourth, there is considerable variation across sites in carbon measurements within each 
type of land use that is masked by the averages in Figure 1.  These variations were especially 
large for fallow, pasture, and agroforestry systems (Braz et al. 1998 and Palm et al. 1999).  
Carbon stocks are particularly impacted by the management and vintage of each land use.  For 
instance, improved pasture with a nitrogen-fixing grass (kudzu) has double the above-ground 
carbon content of an improved fallow without kudzu (6 rather than 3 t/ ha).  The carbon content 
of fallow and perennial crops (such as coffee and agroforestry) also increases with age until they 
reach their maximum carbon content at maturity.  After maturity, the carbon content remains 
constant (Plantiga, et al. 1999).  Finally, since primary forest has already achieved maturity, its 
carbon stock is more or less in equilibrium and the net carbon sequestered is negligible unless 
the forest is burned and the carbon is released into the atmosphere. 
                                                 
3 Note that these below-ground carbon measurements are not adjusted for differences 
in soil type among systems.  See Palm et al. (1999) for details on how below-ground carbon 





Figure 1: Below- and above-ground carbon content by land use in Acre, Brazil 
 
 
Source: Braz, et al. and Palm 1999. 
 
There are eight types of carbon payment schemes that may be relevant for farmers in 
Acre (Table 1).  These are clustered into payments against carbon stocks, carbon flows, and 
net carbon stocks.  Payments are further classified into those that are tied to above-ground or 
total carbon, and whether they are tied specifically to forest or can apply to all farm land uses, 
including fallow, crops, pasture and perennials. 
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For carbon stock payments, an initial inventory is drawn up in the base year of the 
amount of land that is in forest or other designated uses, and then payments are made each year 
against the remaining stock of carbon on those lands.  For example, if the farmer begins with 43 
ha of forest and clears this land progressively over time, then the payments he/she receives 
would decrease over time in direct proportion to the rate of deforestation.  Other things being 
equal, carbon stock payments should slow the rate of deforestation because they increase the 
value of the standing forest. 
In contrast, carbon flow payments are tied to net changes from year to year in the 
stock of carbon held on the farm.  If the farmer increases his/her stock of carbon between 
years, then a payment is received that is proportional to the net addition in sequestered carbon.  
But if the stock of carbon falls from one year to the next, then the farmer would be taxed on the 
basis of the net amount of carbon emitted.  Because primary forest is in an equilibrium state in 
terms of the amount of carbon sequestered, then it does not acquire any additional value under a 
carbon flow payment.  In fact, forest may be viewed as a liability by farmers, because if any of it 





through burning must be offset by considerable carbon sequestration on other land to avoid a 
tax.  
Net carbon stock payments offer a middle ground between the other two extremes.  
In this case, payments against remaining carbon stocks are adjusted to include a tax against any 
carbon that has been emitted from one year to the next.  If, for example, the farmer starts with 
one hectare of forest and clears this progressively over five years, then not only will he/she 
receive a decreasing stock payment over time, but he/she will be liable to a tax each year on the 
amount of carbon emitted through burning forest.  To avoid the tax, then compensatory changes 
in land use would be required elsewhere on the farm to sequester a similar amount of new 
carbon as released by burning. 
The potential for carbon payments to affect forest conservation lies in the large amount 
of carbon already stored in the forest.  For instance, one hectare of forest in Acre contains 150 
tons of above-ground carbon and 206 tons of total carbon (including soil carbon to a depth of 
40 cm) (Braz et al. 1998; Palm et al. 1999).  Thus, even with as small a payment as R$1 per 
ton of carbon stock the annual return to one hectare of standing forest for above-ground carbon 
is R$150, and R$206 for total carbon.
4   If payments are made for 25 years, the net present 
value of those returns would be R$1,473/ha for the above-ground carbon stock, and 
R$2,023/ha for the total carbon stock payment (based on a 9% discount rate).  These returns 
                                                 





compare favorably with current forest revenues from Brazil nut extraction and forest 
management over 25 years, which are R$19 and R$2714 per hectare, respectively.
5 
BASELINE RESULTS 
The model was first run for a 25-year period to create a baseline scenario against which 
all other policy experiments can be compared.  The baseline scenario incorporates the current 
ban on timber harvesting by small-scale farmers,
6 but ignores an existing 50 percent rule that 
mandates that no more than half of any farm can be cleared for agricultural purposes.  This 
policy has not been enforced in recent years and is typically ignored by farmers.
7  The 
representative farm starts the planning period with a land use allocation of 2.5 ha of annuals, 1.5 
ha of perennials, 4 ha of fallow, 9 ha of pasture, and 43 ha of forest, giving a total farm of 60 ha 
                                                 
5 These estimates were generated by valuing labor at its market price of R$7 per day.  
Brazil nut extraction is labor extensive (.05 day per 18 kg) while the managed forestry is more 
labor intensive with an average of 12 man-days per hectare. 
6 Although technically permissible by law, the bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining official 
permission to sustainably harvest timber products in farmers’ legal reserves have been 
insurmountable in practice and have made any on-farm timber extraction difficult.  Such 
practices are therefore not permitted in the scenarios presented here.  Recent changes in 
certification requirements may, in the future, reduce these costs.  Once these new costs are 
known, they could easily be incorporated into the model. 
7 The Brazilian Forest Code number 4.771 obliges landowners to retain 50 percent of 
their holdings as forest reserves, and technically deforestation permits are required for all forest 
felling.  This law was modified in 1997 by presidential decree to stipulate that in states lacking 
approved zoning plans, farms must retain 80 percent of their land in forest.  Small-scale farms 
(those below 250 hectares) were eventually exempted from this decree.  In practice, many pass 
the 50 percent (or 80 percent) line, and fines are rarely assessed on smallholders.  That said, 
some empirical evidence suggests that the law and the enforcement rhetoric associated with it 
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and stocks of 10,067 tons of total carbon and 6500 tons of above ground carbon.  Eighty-nine 
percent of the total carbon is retained in the forest, and most of it is above ground.  
Figure 2 depicts the pattern of land use (including forest, and therefore implicitly 
deforestation) generated by the model over the 25-year time span for this typical small-scale 
farm in Acre.  
 






Several baseline results deserve mention.  First, the amount of forest retained declines 
monotonically over time, and finally disappears altogether by year 25.  This is despite the small 
but positive revenue provided by the extraction of Brazil nuts (an activity currently undertaken 
on about half the farms in the project).  Second, in terms of area, pasture for cattle production is 
the dominant land use activity, and it eventually occupies about 85 percent of the farm.  Third, 
annual crop production occupies only about 8 percent of the farm throughout the 25-year time 
period.  Fourth, perennial crops, which for convenience include manioc production though this is 
not strictly a perennial, take up only about one hectare of land (less than 2 percent of the farm) 
throughout the 25-year period.  Finally, young fallow up to four years old, weaves in and out of 
the baseline solution, before becoming significant as the forest disappears completely.
8  Farm 
income stabilizes after year 13 at approximately R$9,000 per year.  The present day value of 
consumption over the 25-year period is R$50,688 (Table 2). 
The baseline scenario also shows a steady decline in total and above-ground carbon 
stocks (Figure 3).  Starting from an initial stock of 10,067 tons of total carbon and 6500 tons of 
above-ground carbon, these decline to 4,021 and 265 tons, respectively, by year 25 as the 
forest is burnt. 
 
                                                 
8 When the baseline scenario is extended to 35 years, the area in fallow continues to 





Table 2: Simulation results for alternative carbon stock payment schemes 
Scenario  Present day value 
of consumption 
(R$) 
Forest in year 25 
(ha) 
Total carbon in 
year 25 (tons) 
Above-ground 
carbon in year 25  
(tons) 
Baseline  50,688  0   4021  265 
Annual payment for 
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  61,210 
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The model is useful for analyzing the impact of alternative carbon sequestration polices, 
including carbon payments, land use regulations and forest management policies.  Carbon stock 
and carbon flow payments are simulated at five levels of carbon payments (R$0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5 
and 2.0 per ton of carbon).  The carbon payment scenarios assume that farmers would receive 
carbon-offset payments, though this may not necessarily happen under a CDM.  In addition to 
direct carbon payments, the Brazilian government could use other incentive schemes to induce 
farmers to maintain more carbon on their farms.  Two such options are simulated with the 
model: land-use taxes and price subsidies.  The taxes are collected on all low carbon-content 
land uses (essentially, land that is not in forest or woody perennials).  The subsidies are price 
support schemes designed to induce farmers to maintain land-uses with high carbon content.
9 
                                                 
9 Note that coffee is a relatively low carbon content land use though it has three times 





Finally, the government could impose more rigid rules on carbon sequestration, and 
regulate the amount of forest or carbon that is retained, or it could change the rules governing 
forest management.  One example is the existing 50 percent rule, and though this law already 
requires that farmers leave at least 50 percent of their holdings in forest, it is rarely enforced.  
The model is used to simulate what would happen if this rule were enforced, and to evaluate the 
impact of some alternative regulatory systems.  The model is also used to simulate the 
consequences of allowing farmers to practice low-impact forest management in the forest areas 
they choose to preserve.  
Carbon payment policies, including taxes and subsidies, and direct regulations are only 
practical if farmers can be held accountable to measurable carbon performance standards.  
Aggregate whole farm measures are generally best because they allow farmers to retain carbon 
or forest in the most cost effective ways from their perspective.  Two measures are reported in 
the model scenarios: the total area of retained forest and the amount of carbon sequestered 
(above and below ground). 
 
3.    CARBON STOCK PAYMENT SCENARIOS 
ANNUAL PAYMENTS FOR TOTAL FOREST CARBON STOCK  
Under this scenario, farmers receive an annual payment for each ton of total carbon that 





year to capture the relationship between the level of carbon payment and the total carbon 
retained on the farm at year 25 (Table 2).  An annual payment of R$0.10/t of forest would 
preserve 4 ha of forest and 4,473 tons of carbon at year 25 compared with no forest and 4021 
tons of carbon in the baseline.  The preserved amount of forest and total carbon increase to 16 
ha and 6,319 tons if the payment is quintupled to R$0.50/t, and to 42 ha and 9869 tones if the 
payment is increased to R$2/t of forest carbon.  The relationship between the rate of payment 
and the preserved forest area and carbon tonnage is linear for payment rates between R$0.5 
and R$2.0/t (Figure 4).  Over this range, each additional cent payment preserves another 0.173 
ha of forest and 23.7 tons of carbon at year 25.  
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ANNUAL PAYMENTS FOR TOTAL CARBON STOCK ON FARM 
Under this scenario, farmers are paid annually for each ton of total carbon they retain in 
all land-uses on their farms, and not just in their forest.  The payment was again varied from 
R$0.10/t to R$2.00/t.  The resulting impact on on-farm carbon stocks by year 25 is shown in 
Table 2.  This payment scheme leads to similar amounts of total carbon stocks in year 25 as in 
the previous scheme in which payments are tied to the forest area.  For example, a payment of 
R$1.0/t leads to 7409 tons of carbon at year 25, compared to 7571 under the forest carbon 
payment scheme.  The amount of forest saved is also about the same as with the forest payment 
scheme. 
The relationship between the payment rate and the forest area and carbon stock at year 
25 is again linear for payments between R$0.5 and R$2.0/t; each additional cent preserves 
another 0.18 ha of forest and 25.1 tons of carbon.  
ANNUAL PAYMENTS FOR ABOVE-GROUND FOREST CARBON STOCK  
Under this scenario, farmers are paid annually for the above-ground carbon stored in 
their forest.  This scheme retains less forest than the previous carbon payment schemes, but 
does lead to significant amounts of above-ground carbon (Table 2).  
ANNUAL PAYMENTS FOR ABOVE-GROUND CARBON STOCK ON FARM 
Under this scenario, carbon payments are made for every ton of carbon retained above 
ground on the farm, regardless of land use.  The results are very similar to the previous scheme 





smaller amounts of forest and total carbon stocked at year 25 for payments greater than 
R$1.0/t.  
COMPARISON OF CARBON STOCK PAYMENT SCHEMES 
Table 3 summarizes the results for alternative carbon stock payment schemes for one 
level of carbon payment—R$1.0/t of carbon.  All four schemes have similar implications for the 
area of forest and the tons of carbon preserved by year 25.  They all preserve at least 20 ha of 
forest, about half of the original forest area.  Moreover, the two total carbon payment schemes 
preserve more than 75% of the original total carbon on the farm, while the two above-ground 
carbon payment schemes preserve more than 50% of the original above-ground carbon. 
However, there are important differences in the present day value of consumption 
associated with the different payment schemes.  Total carbon payments of R$1.0/t per year 
nearly triple the present day value of consumption over the baseline value of R$50,688, while 
above-ground carbon payments nearly double the value of consumption.  These results have 
important implications for the amount of payment that needs to be transferred to induce farmers 
to retain the amounts of forest and carbon stocks indicated in Table 3.  For each carbon 
payment scheme, the difference between the present day value of consumption and the baseline 
value of R$50,688 is a direct measure of the present day value of the transfers that would be 
required over the 25 year period.  For example, to preserve 7,571 tons of total carbon through 
forest carbon payments, it would take annual transfers equivalent to a lump sum payment today 





carbon saved by year 25.  This cost increases to R$81,538 (or R$24/t) if the payments are 
made against carbon in all land uses, even though the amount of carbon and forest preserved is 
slightly smaller.  The above-ground payments are more cost-effective, costing only R$15 per 
ton of carbon saved.  They are also a cheaper way to preserve forest, costing about 
R$2,200/ha of forest by year 25 compared to R$2659 and R$3397/ha for the two total carbon 
payment schemes. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of carbon stock payment schemes with rate of R$1.0/t/year 




















50,688  117,165  132,226  97,518  98,489 
Forest in year 25 
(ha) 
0  25  24  21  22 
Total carbon in 
year 25 (t) 
4021  7571  7409  --  -- 
Above-ground 
carbon in year 
25 (t) 
265  --  --  3330  3472 
Present day 
value of 
transfers over 25 
years (R$) 
--  66,477  81,538  46,830  47,801 
R$/t of total 
carbon 
--  19  24  --  -- 
R$/t of above-
ground carbon 
--  --  --  15  15 





4.    CARBON FLOW PAYMENT SCHEMES 
ANNUAL PAYMENTS FOR NET ABOVE-GROUND CARBON STOCK; ALL LAND 
USES 
In this scenario, annual carbon stock payments are based on the stock of carbon 
remaining at the end of each year in all land uses, but adjusted down by a tax on carbon emitted 
from any forest burnt during the year.  The results are shown in Table 4.  This type of payment 
yields marginally more carbon and forest area at year 25 than the previous above-ground 
carbon stock payment scheme for payments greater than R$1.0/t.  For example, with a 
payment of R$2.0/t, 36 ha of forest and 5358 tons of above-ground carbon remain in year 25 
compared to 33 ha forest and 4977 tons above-ground carbon with the above-ground carbon 
scheme (all land uses) in Table 2.  The difference is due to the tax on carbon emissions from 
clearing forest. 
ANNUAL PAYMENTS FOR ABOVE-GROUND AND TOTAL CARBON FLOWS; ALL 
LAND USES 
Under these scenarios farmers receive annual per ton payments for carbon flows from 
one year to the next computed as carbon in year t + 1 minus carbon in year t.  Higher payments 
(and taxes) are needed to induce significant land use changes with these schemes.  For instance, 
a payment of R$1.0/t for above-ground carbon only preserves 6 ha of forest at year 25 
compared with more than 20 ha with most of the carbon stock payment schemes in Table 3.  





R$9.0/t is required on above-ground carbon (Table 4), while a R$1/t payment is adequate to 
induce a similar result with the carbon stock payment scheme (Table 2).  
 
Table 4: Simulation results for carbon flow and net carbon stock payment schemes 
Scenario  Present day value 
of consumption 
(R$) 
Forest in year 
25 (ha) 
Total carbon in 
year 25 (tons) 
Above-ground 
carbon in year 25 
(tons) 
Baseline  50,688  0   4021  265 
Net above-ground 











  57,065 
  74,507 
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The above-ground carbon flow payment scheme leads to less forest and fallow than the 
total carbon flow payment scheme.  This difference increases as the level of payment increases. 
 For example, a carbon flow payment of R$9/t maintains 36 ha of forest when tied to above-





schemes induce a larger area of fallow than their carbon stock payment counterparts.  
However, although the use of cleared land changes to increase carbon sequestration, it is not 
enough to offset the emissions from deforestation.  Therefore farmers have to pay a carbon tax 
every year instead of receiving payments as with the carbon stock payment schemes.  A R$1/t 
payment or tax on above-ground carbon flow reduces the present day value of consumption to 
R$46,056, a 5 percent reduction from the baseline, while a R$9/t annual payment reduces the 
present day value of consumption to R$21,778, a 57 percent reduction from the baseline.  
Consumption is slightly lower under the above-ground carbon flow payment scheme.  The 
carbon flow payment scheme essentially acts as a tax that farmers have to pay to deforest, and 
it is more profitable for them to alter their land uses on cleared land, slow deforestation, and pay 
the tax than to halt deforestation completely. 
COMPARISON OF CARBON FLOW PAYMENT SCHEMES 
Table 5 compares the three carbon flow schemes for the same payment rate of R$1.0/t 
of carbon.  The net above ground carbon stock scheme saves considerably more forest and 
carbon, but at much higher unit costs (R$4611/ha of forest and R$14/t of carbon).  The present 
day value of the transfers over 25 years is also high at R$46,112.  The carbon flow schemes are 
much less effective at protecting forest and carbon at the same payment rate of R$1/t, but the 
costs per unit saved are much lower.  Moreover, because farmers are taxed when they 
deforest, the present day value of the transfers is negative; farmers are actually made worse off 





use with the carbon flow payment schemes, and this leads to significant losses in the present day 
value of consumption (Table 4).  
 
Table 5: Comparison of carbon flow and net carbon stock payment schemes (R$1.0/t) 











50,688  96,800  46,056   47,437 
Forest at year 
25  (ha) 
0  23   6  7 
Total carbon in 
year 25 (t) 
4021  --  --  4827 
Above-ground 
carbon in year 
25 (t) 




25 years (R$) 
--  46,112  -4,632  -3251 
R$/t of total 
carbon 
--  --  --  -4 
R$/t of above-
ground carbon 
--  14  -6  -- 
R$/ha forest  --  4611  -201  -452 
 
5.    ALTERNATIVE POLICIES FOR CONSERVING CARBON 
Carbon payment schemes are one instrument for encouraging farmers to sequester 
carbon.  But other policies may also be effective and it is useful to evaluate some of these 






Land taxes on low-carbon land uses could be one way to encourage greater carbon 
sequestration.  We consider two types of land taxes.  The first is a tax on all cleared land, while 
the second is a tax on all cleared land that is planted to non-perennials.  
A tax on all cleared land of R$32/ha would reduce the net present value of farm 
consumption to R$38,007 and yet preserve only 5 ha of forest and 4,679 tons of total carbon in 
year 25 (Table 6).
10  A similar tax on all cleared land planted to non-perennials reduces the net 
present value of consumption to R$41,419 while saving only 3 ha of forest and 4442 tons of 
carbon (Table 6).  A tax on land-uses does not appear to be very effective, and would induce 
considerable loss in small farm welfare for only modest gains in carbon sequestration. 
 
                                                 
10 Increasing the tax beyond R$32 per hectare makes it impossible for farmers to pay 
the tax and feed their families.  Imposing a tax on cleared land planted to non-perennials also 
yields an infeasible solution for payments above R$32 per hectare because farmers do not have 
enough labor or money to plant nonperennials. 26 
 
 
Table 6: Alternative policy scenarios for retaining carbon 


























50,688  44,201  50,414  50,299  43,461  15,913  54,333  38,007  41,419 
Forest in year 
25 (ha) 
0  30  2  13  28  43  9  5  3 
Total carbon in 
year 25 (t) 
4,021  8,199  4000  6000  8000  10,000  5,137  4,679  4,442 
Above-ground 
carbon in year 
25 (t) 




25 years (R$) 
--  -6487  -274  -389  -7227  -34,775  3645  -12,681  -9269 
R$/t of total 
carbon 
--  -1.6  -13.0  -0.2  -1.8  -5.8   3.3  -19.3  -22.0 
R$/t of above 
ground carbon  
--  -1.5  --  --  --  --   3.1  --  -- 





Instead of directly paying farmers for carbon sequestration, policymakers could use 
market incentives to favor land-uses with high carbon content.  Carpentier, Vosti, and Witcover 
(forthcoming) have demonstrated that when labor-intensive land-uses such as coffee are 
adopted, more forest is preserved and less pasture is seeded.  Coffee was not a profitable crop 
to grow in Acre in 1994 because the coffee price was low and inputs were expensive.  
Seedling, fertilizer and pesticide subsidies might switch the balance in favor of coffee production. 
 Four scenarios for subsidizing inputs were considered: 
￿ free coffee seedlings 
￿ free coffee seedlings and a 50 percent fertilizer subsidy 
￿ free coffee seedlings and free pesticides 
￿ free coffee seedlings and free fertilizer. 
 
Free coffee seedlings do not induce farmers to plant more coffee even when a 50 
percent subsidy is offered on fertilizer.  Moreover, the forest disappears within 25 years and 
only low levels of total carbon are sequestered (Table 7).  More carbon-saving land uses are 
adopted when free seedlings and free fertilizer are offered. Under this scenario, 8 ha of forest 
and 2.7 ha of coffee remain after 25 years.  The scenario maintains 5,014 tons of carbon in year 
25, approximately 1,000 more tons than in the baseline.  The present day value of the transfers 
are worth R$32,018.  The free coffee seedling and free pesticide scenario only retains 186 tons 
of carbon more than the baseline after 25 years but at a cost of R$5032 in the present day value 





Table 7: Results for alternative coffee input subsidy schemes 




Forest area at 
year 25 (ha) 
Total 
carbon at 
year 25 (t) 
Present day value 
of transfers over 25 
years (R$) 
Baseline  50,688  0  4021  -- 
Free seedlings  51,121  1  4182  433 
Free seedlings 
plus 50% fertilizer 
subsidy 
54,389  1  4242  3,701 
Free seedlings and 
pesticides 
55,720  2  4207  5,032 
Free seedlings and 
fertilizer 
82,706  8  5014  32,018 
 
 
THE 50 PERCENT RULE 
The baseline scenario did not incorporate the federal law prohibiting deforestation 
beyond 50 percent for small farms.  Once this restriction is introduced into the model, virtually 
all the land that can be deforested is dedicated to pasture and livestock production activities.  
Annual crop production and fallow decline over time.  Farmers adhering to the 50 percent rule 
can expect the present day value of their consumption to fall to R$44,200, a 13 percent decline 
from the baseline (Table 6).  The shadow price on the 50 percent forest restriction increases 
from 0 in the first six years (until the 30 ha upper bound is reached) to R$200/ha by the 25
th 
year.  Implementation of the 50 percent rule would double the total carbon stock compared to 





PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON CARBON 
In these scenarios, the farmer is required to meet specified carbon performance 
standards that are specified as minimum constraints on the amount of total carbon stock that 
must be maintained at all times.  Four standards are simulated, corresponding to total carbon 
constraints of 4,000, 6,000, 8,000, and 10,000 tons.  The highest level is approximately the 
same as the initial stock of 10,067 tons of total carbon available at the beginning of the planning 
horizon.  
Only small amounts of forest are preserved at year 25 with the 4,000 and 6,000 
minimum ton constraints (2 and 13 ha, respectively), but these increase to 28 and 43 ha of 
forest when the minimum is increased to 8,000 and 10,000 tons of total carbon, respectively 
(Table 6).  As the standard gets stricter, more and more forest and fallow are maintained on the 
farm.  The present day value of consumption is barely affected until the carbon constraint is 
raised to 8000 tons, at which time there is a loss of R$7,227.  This loss increases to R$34,775 
when the carbon constraint is increased to 10,000 tons, a 69 percent reduction from the 
baseline value.  The corresponding unit costs to the farmer are R$5.8 and R$809 for each ton 
of carbon and hectare of forest saved, respectively.  These are the amounts of money that the 
farmer would need to be given today to induce him/her to preserve 10,000 tons of carbon and 
43 hectares of forest. 
FOREST MANAGEMENT OPTION 
Sustainable forest management on private holdings is currently being evaluated in Brazil 





standing forest. Data for the simulation were based on on-farm trials conducted by EMBRAPA 
in which the forest is harvested on a rotational basis every 10 years using low-intensity 
extraction methods, including improved felling techniques and use of oxen instead of tractors to 
drag wood, and extraction rates of 10 cubic meters/ha/year compared to 30-40 cubic 
meters/ha/year traditionally extracted by loggers (Borges de Araujo and de Oliveira 1996; 
Neves d’Oliveira, Borges de Araujo, and de Oliveira 1996).  
When introduced into the model, the sustainable forest management option leads to the 
retention of 9 ha of forest at year 25 compared to zero in the baseline scenario (Table 6).  The 
area of fallow is also reduced to zero, and there is a slight reduction in the area in pasture, 
though this continues to be the predominant land-use.  The present day value of consumption 
increases by 7.2 percent to R$54,333, and the total carbon stock at year 25 increases by 28 
percent to 5,137 tons.  Thus, farmers practicing forest management in their private forest 
reserve would gain additional income and increase their above-ground and total carbon stocks. 
 As the price of timber increases (as it has done in recent years), forest management may 
become even more attractive (Carpentier, Vosti, and Witcover, forthcoming).  
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE CDM POLICIES 
The only policies that preserve as much carbon and forest as the carbon stock payment 
schemes are the 50% rule and the 8,000 tons carbon performance standard. These schemes 
also achieve significant preservation at low cost to the government because they rely on 





However, they have high costs to the farmer in terms of the present day value of consumption 
they must forego. 
Subsidies on coffee inputs and taxes on low carbon land uses are not effective in 
preserving forest and carbon, but they are costly either to the government in terms of subsidies 
or to the farmer in terms of taxes.  Allowing farmers to undertake sustainable forestry practices 
and low-intensity extraction increases farm income and the present day value of consumption, 
but has only modest impacts on the amount of forest and carbon preserved. 
6.    CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has evaluated the possibilities for using carbon payments as a way to 
sequester more carbon on small farms in the forest margins of the Brazil’s Western Amazon 
region.  Alternative carbon payment schemes were evaluated with the aid of a model of a typical 
small farmer in a settlement project in the state of Acre.  The model was also used to evaluate 
some alternative policies that the government might pursue to achieve the same objectives as 
carbon payments. 
The main conclusions are that carbon payments can be effective in conserving forest and 
sequestering carbon, but the payments should be tied to carbon stocks or net carbon stocks 
rather than carbon flows.  An annual payment of R$1/t for each ton of carbon stored in the 
forest (both above and below ground) could save about half the existing area of forest on the 
representative farm, and about 75 percent of the existing total carbon.  This payment scheme is 





year 25.  If the payment is tied to carbon in all land uses rather than just forest, the results are 
much the same but the cost increases to the equivalent of a lump sum transfer today of 
R$81,538 per farm, or R$24/t of carbon remaining at year 25.  
The cost of carbon payments can be reduced considerably by tying the payments to 
above-ground rather than total carbon.  With this approach it does not matter whether the 
payment is tied to forest or all land uses, and it leads to preservation of about half of the existing 
stock of forest and above-ground carbon at year 25.  The cost is equivalent to a lump sum 
transfer today of about R$47,000 per farm, or R$15/t of above-ground carbon remaining at 
year 25. 
The opportunity cost of carbon offset on small farms in Acre, Brazil, is consistent with 
previous estimates for tropical forest carbon and low compared to previous estimates for other 
parts of the world and other industries.  For instance, Richards (1999) reports carbon offset 
costs of between $2 and $10 per ton of tropical forest carbon.  In Costa Rica, 200,000 tons of 
carbon was sold in 1996 at an average cost of $10 per ton (Richards 1999).  Plantiga, Mauldin, 
and Miller (1999) find that costs to enroll 25% of Maine, South Carolina, and Wisconsin’s 
agricultural land in an afforestation project would costs an average of $60, $45, and $48/t of 
carbon, respectively.  The current price paid for carbon offsets is $10-12 per ton of carbon 
(Stuart and Moura-Costa 1998).  Duncan et al. (1999) report a predicted abatement cost per 
ton of carbon of $0 to 2 and $2 to 3 for chemical co-generation of energy and plantations, and 





In general, developing countries such as Brazil are not in favor of including forest carbon 
in carbon-offset projects.  Brazil’s position is that forest carbon projects do not embody any 
technology transfer benefits, unlike most other carbon-offset projects under the CD.  The results 
of this study show that agricultural carbon payments that do not include forest carbon do not 
benefit small-scale Western Amazonian farmers, or save much forest.  If the Kyoto Protocol 
were amended to allow for conservation of forest carbon, then CDMs could provide 
inexpensive carbon offsets, alleviate poverty, and preserve biodiversity.  
Of the alternative policies to carbon payments analyzed in this paper, the only ones that 
preserve as much carbon and forest as the carbon stock payment schemes are the 50% rule 
and the 8,000 tons carbon performance standard.  These schemes also achieve significant 
preservation at low cost to the government because they rely on regulation and compulsion 
rather than on payments to farmers to change land-use incentives.  However, they have high 
costs to the farmer in terms of the present day value of consumption they must forego, and 
would seriously reduce the welfare of an already marginal group. 
Subsidies on coffee inputs and taxes on low carbon land uses are not effective in 
preserving forest and carbon, but they are costly either to the government in terms of subsidies 
or to the farmer in terms of taxes.  
Allowing farmers to undertake sustainable forestry practices with low-intensity timber 
extraction increases farm income and the present day value of consumption, but has 
disappointing impacts on the amount of forest and carbon preserved.  This result is less 





cost carbon offsets and a supply of up to 1 billion tons of carbon on both private and public 
forests in the Amazon.  
In order to implement a carbon stock payment scheme, important measurement issues 
would have to be resolved.  Rapid developments are being made with Geographic Positioning 
Systems (GPS) and Dual Camera Videography that will help reduce the costs of measuring and 
enforcing carbon offset projects.  For instance, Southgate (1998) found that the cost of land-
use assessment in the Amazon based on satellite imagery and ground-truthing was less than 
$0.20 per hectare.  New technologies are quickly being developed to reduce these costs, such 
as a patent recently filed by ECCI, an Illinois corporation, to certify emissions reductions. New 
methodologies are also being developed to facilitate and standardize below-ground carbon 
measurements (Palm et al. 1999).  
Transaction costs might also be reduced through emerging companies that offer services 
as clearing-houses between buyers and sellers of carbon (Environmental Correct Concepts, Inc. 
(ECCI)), and by institutions such as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research and Winrock International that are providing training in carbon measurement.  More 
work is needed, however, on the institutions needed to minimize the costs of such a project, 
especially if small farmers are to take advantage of this new opportunity.  If developed countries 
want to ensure that carbon trade will help alleviate poverty, in addition to slowing climate 
change, they must insist that CDM projects are designed to include small farmers.  To make this 
possible, research on ways to reduce the transaction costs of trading with thousands of small 





found, then small farmers will be excluded from the technology transfer and other benefits that 
might accrue from carbon trade.  To be successful, CDMs will most likely have to provide 
value-added technology to “occupy” labor and reduce incentives to deforest and cultivate land 
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